Napoleon I (Bonaparte) 
continued

Despite the rigour of his captivity, Pius VI was able to make known the pontifical commands to Cardinal di Pietro at Semur; a secret agency at Lyons, established by certain members of the Congregation, devised ingenious ways of facilitating these communications as well as the circulation of Bulls. In November, 1810, the Court was stupefied with the news that two Bulls of Pius VI, addressed to the Chapters of Florence and Paris, forbade their recognizing D'Osmond and Maury. The imperial fury was let loose. On 1 January, 1811, Napoleon, during an audience to Maury and the canons, demanded an explanation from d'Astros, the vicar capitular, who had received the Bull, telling him that there is "as much difference between the religion of Bossuet and that of Gregory VII as between heaven and hell"; d'Astros, taken by Maury himself to police headquarters, was imprisoned at Vincennes. At the Council of State, 4 January, 1811, Portalis, a relative of d'Astros, was openly accused of treason by Napoleon, and immediately put out of the council chamber (with a brutality that the emperor afterwards regretted) and was then ordered to quit Paris. Cardinals di Pietro, Oppizzone, and Gabrielli, and the priests Fontana and Gregori, former counsellors of the pope, were thrown into prison. Maury used his influence with the canons of Paris to induce them to apologize to Napoleon, who received them, told them that the pope must not treat him as a roi fainéant, and declared that, since the pope was not acting up to the Concordat in the matter of institution of bishops, the emperor, on his side, renounced the Concordat. The conditions of the pope's captivity were made more severe; all his correspondence had to pass through Paris, to be inspected by the Government; the lock of his desk was picked; he could no longer receive visits without the presence of witnesses; a gendarme demanded of him the ring of St. Peter, which Pius VI surrendered after breaking it in two. Chabrol, the pope's custodian, showed him the addresses to which some of the chapters were expressing their submission to the emperor, but Pius VI was inflexible. A commission of jurisconsults in Paris, after discussing the possibility of a law regulating the canonical institution of bishops without the pope's co operation, ended by deciding that to pass such a law was almost equivalent to schism.

Napoleon was not willing to go so far. He summoned the ecclesiastical council which he had already established and, 8 February, 1811, proposed to it these two questions: (1) All communication between the pope and the emperor's subjects being interrupted, to whom must recourse be had for the dispensations ordinarily granted by the Holy See? (2) What canonical means is there of providing institution for bishops when the pope reuses it? Fesch and Emery tried to sway the council towards some courses which would save the papal prerogative. But the majority of the council answered: (1) That recourse might be had, provisionally, to the bishops for the dispensations in question; 2) That a clause might be added to the Concordat stipulating that the pope must grant canonical institution within a stated time; failing which, the right of institution would devolve upon the council of the province; and that, if the pope rejected this amendment of the Corcordat, the Pragmatic Sanction would have to be revived so far as concerned bishops. The council added that, if the pope persisted in his refusal, the possibility of a public abolition of the Concordat by the emperor would have to be considered; but that these questions could be broached only by a national council, after one last attempt at negotiation with the pope.

On 16 March, 1811, Napoleon summoned to the Tuileries the members of the council and several of the great dignitaries of the empire; inveighing bitterly against the pope, he proclaimed that the Concordat no longer existed and that he was going to convoke a council of the West. At this meeting Emery, who died on 28 April, boldly faced Napoleon, quoting to him passages from Bossuet on the necessity of the pope's liberty. Pius VI not yielding to a last summons on the part of Chabrol, the council was convoked on 25 April to meet on 9 June. By this step Napoleon expected to subdue the pope to his will. In pursuance of a plan outlined by the philosopher Gerando, Archbishop Barral, and Bishops Duvoisin and Mannay were sent to Pius VI to gain him over on the question of the Bulls of institution. They were joined by the Bishop of Faenza, and arrived at Savona on 9 May. At first the pope refused to discuss the matter, not being free to communicate with his cardinals. But the bishops and Chabrol insisted, and the pope's physician added his efforts to theirs. They represented that the Church was becoming disorganized. At the end of nine days, the pope, who was neither eating nor drinking anything, being very much fatigued, consented, not to ratify, but to take as "a basis of negotiation" a note drawn up by the four bishops to the purport that, in case of persistent refusal on his part, canonical institution might be given to bishops after six months. On 20 May, at four o'clock in the morning, the bishops started for Paris with this note; at seven o'clock the pope summoned Chabrol and told him that he did not accept the note in any definitive sense, that he considered it only a sketch, and that he had made no formal promise. He also asked that a courier should be sent after the bishops to warn them of this. The courier bearing this message overtook the bishops at Turin on 24 May. Pius VII warned Chabrol that if the first note were exploited as representing an arrangement definitely accepted by the pope, he "would make a noise that should resound through the whole Christian world". Napoleon, in his blindness, resolved to do without the pope and put all his hopes in the council.

Council of 1811

The council convoked for 9 June, 1811, was not opened at Notre Dame until 17 June, the opening being postponed on account of the baptism of the King of Rome, just born of Marie Louise. Paternal pride and the seemingly assured destinies of his throne rendered Napoleon still more inflexible in regard to the pope. Only since 1905 has the truth about this council been known, thanks to Welschinger's researches. Under the Second Empire, when D'Haussonville wrote his work on the Roman Church and the First Empire (see below) Marshal Vallant had refused him all access to the archives of the council. These archives Welsinger was able to consult. Boulogne, Bishop of Troyes, in his opening sermon affirmed the solidarity of the pope and the bishops, while Fesch, as president of the council, made all its members swear obedience and fidelity to Pius VII. Upon this Napoleon gave Fesch a sound rating, on the evening of 19 June, at Saint Cloud. The emperor had packed his council in very arbitrary fashion, choosing only 42 out of 150 Italian bishops to mix with the French bishops, with a view to ecumenical effect. A private bulletin sent to the emperor, 24 June, noted that the fathers of the council themselves were generally impressed with a sense of restraint. The opposition to the emperor was very firmly led by Broglie, Bishop of Ghent, seconded by Aviau, Archbishop of Bordeaux, Dessole, Bishop of Chambéry, and Hirn, Bishop of Tournai. The first general assembly of the council was held on 20 June. Bigot de Préameneu and Marescalchi, ministers of public worship for France and Italy, were present and read the imperial message, one draft of which had been rejected by Napoleon as too moderate. The final version displeased all the bishops who had any regard for the papal dignity. Napoleon in this document demanded that bishops should be instituted in accordance with the forms which had obtained before the Concordat, no see to be vacant for longer than three months, "more than sufficient time for appointing a new incumbent". He wished the council to present an address to him, and the committee that should prepare this address to be composed of the four prelates he had sent to Savona. The address, which was prepared in advance by Duvoisin, one of these four prelates, was an expression of assent to Napoleon's wishes. But the council decided to have on the committee besides these four prelates, some other bishops chosen by secret ballot, and among the latter figured Broglie. Broglie discussed Duvoisin's draft and had a number of changes made in it, and Fesch had some trouble in keeping the committee from at once demanding the liberation of the pope. The address, as voted, was nonsensical. It was not what Napoleon expected, and the audience which he was to have given to the members of the council on 30 June, did not take place.

Another committee was appointed by the council to inquire into the pope's views on the institution of bishops. After a conflict of ten days, Broglie secured against Duvoisin, by a vote of 8 to 4, a resolution to the effect that, in this matter, nothing must be done without the pope, and that the council ought to send him a deputation to learn what was his will. Napoleon was furious and said to Fesch and Barral: "I will dissolve the council. You are a pack of fools". Then, on second thought, he informed the council that Pius VII by way of concession, had formally promised canonical institution to the vacant bishoprics and had approved a clause enabling the metropolitans themselves in future, after six months vacancy of any see, to give canonical institution. Napoleon requested the council to issue a note to this effect and sent a deputation to thank the pope. First the committee voted as the emperor wished, then, on more mature consideration, suspecting some stratagem on the emperor's part, it recalled its vote, and, on 10 July, Hirn, Bishop of Tournai, speaking for the committee, proposed to the council that no decision be made until a deputation had been sent to the pope. Then, on the morning of 11 July, Napoleon pronounced the council dissolved. The following night Broglie, Hirn, and Boulogne were imprisoned at Vincennes. The emperor next thought of turning over the administration of the dioceses to the prefects, but presently took the advice of Maury, viz., to have all the members of the council called up, one by one, by the minister of public worship, and their personal assent to the imperial project obtained in this way. After fifteen days devoted to conversations between the minister and certain of the bishops, the emperor reconvoked the council for 5 August, and the council, by a vote of 80 to 13, passed the decree by which canonical institution was to be given within six months, either by the pope or, if he refused, by the metropolitan. The bishops who passed this decree tried to palliate their weakness by saying that they had no idea of committing an act of rebellion, but formally asked for, and hoped to obtain, the pope's assent. Napoleon believed himself victorious; he held in his hands the means of circumventing the pope and organizing without his co operation the administration of French and Italian dioceses. He had brought the Sacred College, the Dataria, the Penitentiary, and the Vatican Archives to Paris, and had spent several millions in improving the archiepiscopal palace which he meant to make the pontifical palace. He wished to remove the Hôtel Dieu, install the departments of the Roman Curia in its place, and make the quarter of Notre Dame and the Isle de Saint Louis the capital of Catholicism. But his victory was only apparent: to make the decree of the national council valid, the pope's ratification was needed, and once more the resistance of Pius VII was to hold the emperor in check.

On 17 August Napoleon commissioned the Archbishops of Tours and Mechlin, the Patriarch of Venice, the Bishops of Evreux, Trier, Feltro, and Piacenza to go to Savona and demand of the pope his full adhesion to the decree of 5 August; the bishops were even to be precise in stating that the decree applied to episcopal sees in the former Papal States, so that, in giving his assent, Pius VII should by implication assent to the abolition of the temporal power. That Pius VII might not allege the absence of the cardinals as a reason for postponing his decisions, Napoleon sent to Savona five cardinals on whom he could rely (Roverella, Dugnani, Fabrizio Ruffo, Bayanne, and Doria) with instructions to support the bishops. The emperor's artifice was successful. On 6 September, 1811, Pius VII declared himself ready to yield, and charged Roverella to draw up a Brief approving the Decree of 5 August, and on 20 September the pope signed the Brief. But even then, the Brief as it was, was not what Napoleon wanted: Pius VII abstained from recognizing the council as a national council, he treated the Church of Rome as the mistress of all the Churches, and did not specify that the decree applied to the bishoprics of the Roman States; he also required that, when a metropolitan gave canonical institution, it should be given in the name of the pope. Napoleon did not publish the Brief. On 17 October he ordered the deputation of prelates to notify the pope that the decree applied equally to bishoprics in the Roman States. This interpretation Pius VII then formally repudiated, and announced once more that any further decision on his part would be postponed until he should have with him a suitable number of cardinals. Napoleon first wreaked his irritation on the Bishops of Ghent, Tournai, and Troyes, whom he forced to resign their sees and caused to be deported to various towns, then, on 3 December, he declared the Brief unacceptable, and charged the prelates to ask for another. Pius VII refused.

On 9 January, 1812, the prelates informed the pope, from the emperor, that, if the pope resisted any longer, the emperor would act on his own discretion in the matter of the institution of bishops. Pius VII sent a personal reply to the emperor, to the effect that he (the pope) needed a more numerous council and facility of communication with the faithful, and that he would then do, "to meet the emperor's wishes, all that was consistent with the duties of his Apostolic ministry." By way of rejoinder, Napoleon dictated to his minister of public worship, on 9 February, an extraordinarily vehement letter, addressed to the deputation of prelates. In it he refused to give Pius VII his liberty or to let the "black cardinals" go back to him; he made known that if the pope persisted in the refusal to govern the Church, they would do without the pope; and he advised the pope, in insulting terms, to abdicate. Chabrol, the prefect of Montenotte, read this letter to Pius VII, and advised him to surrender the tiara. "Never", was the pope's answer. Then on 23 February, Chabrol notified the pope, in the emperor's name, that Napoleon considered the Concordats abrogated, and that he would no longer permit the pope to interfere in any way in the canonical institution of the bishops. Pius VII answered that he would not change his attitude. Mme de Staël wrote to Henri Meister: "What a power is religion which gives strength to the weak when all that was strong has lost its strength!" The difference between the pope and the emperor naturally reacted upon the feelings of the clergy towards Napoleon, and upon the emperor's policy towards religion. From this time Napoleon refused the seminarists any exemption from military service. He made stricter the university monopoly of teaching, and Broglie, Bishop of Ghent, who, after leaving the prison of Vincennes, had continued to correspond with his clergy, was sent to the Island of Sainte Marguerite.

Last Great Wars: Concordat of Fontainebleau

At this time Napoleon was absolutely drunk with power. The French Empire had 130 departments; the Kingdom of Italy 240. The seven provinces of Illyria were subject to France. The rigour of the Continental blockade was ruining English commerce and embarrassing the European states. The tsar would have liked Napoleon, master of the West, to leave him freedom of action in Poland and Turkey; enraged at receiving no such concessions, he approached England. The French armies in Spain were exhausting their strength in a savage and ineffectual war against a ceaseless uprising of the native population; nevertheless Napoleon resolved to attack Russia also. At Dresden, from March to June, 1812, he held a congress of kings, and prepared for war. It was at Dresden, in May, 1812, that, under pretext of satisfying the demands of Francis Joseph for gentler treatment of the pope, Napoleon decided to have Pius VIIremoved from Savona to Fontainebleau; the fact is that he was afraid the English would attempt a coup de main on Savona and carry off the pope. After a journey the painful incidents of which have been related by d'Haussonville, following a manuscript in the British Museum, Pius VII reached Fontainebleau on 19 June. Equipages were placed at his disposal, he was desired to appear in public and officiate; but he refused, led a solitary life in the interior of the palace, and gave not the least indication of being ready to yield to Napoleon's demands.

Napoleon definitely declared war against the tsar on 22 June, 1812. The issue was soon seen to be dubious. The Russians devastated the whole country in advance of the French armies, and avoided pitched battles as much as possible. The victory of Borodino (7 September, 1812), an extremely bloody one, opened to Napoleon the gates of Moscow (14 September, 1812). He had expected to pass the winter there, but the conflagration brought about by the Russians forced him to retrace his steps westward, and the retreat of the "Grande Armée" so heroically covered by Marshall Ney, cost France the lives of numberless soldiers. The passage of the Beresina was glorious. As far as Lithuania, Napoleon shared the sufferings of his army, then he hastened to Paris, where he suppressed General Malet's conspiracy and prepared a new war for the year 1813. When he set out for Prussia it was his idea to extend his march beyond that country, through Asia to India, to knock over "the scaffolding of mercantile greatness raised by the English, and strike England to the heart". "After this", he declared, "it will be possible to settle everything and have done with this business of Rome and the pope. The cathedral of Paris will become that of the Catholic world. . . . If Bossuet were living now, he would have been Archbishop of Paris long ago, and the pope would still be at the Vatican, which would be much better for everybody, for then there would be no pontifical throne higher than that of Notre Dame, and Paris could not fear Rome. With such a president, I would hold a Council of Nicæa in Gaul."

But the failure of the Russian campaign upset all these dreams. The emperor's haughty attitude towards the Church was now modified. On 29 December, 1812, he wrote with his own hand an affectionate letter to the pope expressing a desire to end the quarrel. Duvoisin was sent to Fontainebleau to negotiate a Concordat. Napoleon's demands were these: the pope must swear to do nothing against the four articles; he must condemn the behaviour of the black cardinals towards the emperor; he must allow the Catholic sovereigns to chose two thirds of the cardinals, take up his residence in Paris, accept the decree of the council on the canonical institution of bishops, and agree to its application to the bishoprics of the Roman States. PPius VIIspent ten days discussing the matter. On 18 January, 1813, the emperor himself came to Fontainebleau and spent many days in stormy interviews with the pope though, according to Pius VII's own statement to Count Paul Van der Vrecken, on 27 September, 1814, Napoleon committed no act of violence against the pope. On 25 January, 1813, a new Concordat was signed. In it there was no mention either of the Four Articles, or of the nomination of cardinals by the Catholic sovereigns, or of the pope's place of residence: the six suburbican dioceses were left at the pope's disposition, and he could moreover provide directly for ten bishoprics, either in France or in Italy — on all these points Napoleon made concessions. But on the other hand, the pope confirmed the decree of the Council of 1811 on the canonical institution of bishops.

According to the very words of its preamble, this Concordat was intended only "to serve as basis for a definitive arrangement". But, on 13 February, Napoleon had it published, just as it stood, as a law of the State. This was very unfair towards Pius VII; the emperor had no right to convert "preliminary articles" thus into a definitive act. On 9 February the imprisoned cardinals had been liberated by Napoleon; going to Fontainebleau, they had found Pius VII very anxious on the subject of the signature he had given, and which he regretted. With the advice of Consalvi, he prepared to retract the "preliminary articles". In his letter of 24 March to Napoleon he reproached himself for having signed these articles and disavowed the signature he had given. Napoleon had failed egregiously. He did not listen to the advice of the Comte de Narbonne, who, in a letter drafted by young Villemain, expressed the opinion that the pope ought to be set at liberty and sent back to Rome. It has been claimed that Napoleon had said to his ministers of State: "If I don't knock the head off the shoulders of some of those priests at Fontainebleau, matters will never be arranged." This is a legend; on the contrary, he ordered the minister of public worship to keep secret the letter of 24 March. Immediately, acting on his own authority, he declared the Concordat of Fontainebleau binding on the Church, and filled twelve vacant sees. On 5 April he had Cardinal di Pietro removed from Fontainebleau and threatened to do the same for Cardinal Pacca.

In the Dioceses of Ghent, Troyes, and Tournai, the chapters regarded the bishops appointed by Napoleon as intruders. The irregular measures of the emperor only exasperated the resistance of the clergy. The Belgian clergy, warned by Count Van der Vrecken of the pope's retractation, began to agitate against the imperial policy. Meanwhile, on 25 April, 1813, Napoleon assumed command of the Army of Germany. The victories of Lutzen (2 May) and Bautzen (19 22 May) weakened the Prussian and Russian troops. But the emperor made the mistakes of accepting the mediation of Austria — only a device to gain time — and of consenting to hold the Congress of Prague (July). A letter from Pius VII, secretly carried in the face of many dangers by Van der Vrecken, warned the Congress of Prague that the pope formally rejected the articles of 25 January. Napoleon continued nevertheless to send from his headquarters with the army severe orders calculated to overcome the resistance of the Belgian clergy; on 6 August he caused the director of the seminary of Ghent to be imprisoned, and all the students to be taken to Magdeburg; on 14 August he had the canons of Tournai arrested. But his perils were increasing. Joseph had been driven out of Spain. Bernadotte, King of Sweden, one of Napoleon's own veterans, was driving the french troops out of Stralsund. Under Schwarzenberg, Blücher and Bernadotte, three armies were forming against the emperor. He had but 280,000 men against 500,000. He was victor at Dresden (27 August), but his generals were falling away on all sides. He was deserted by the Bavarian contingents in the celebrated "Battle of the Nations" at Leipzig (18 19 October), the defection of the Wurtembergers and the Saxons was the chief cause of his defeat. The victories of Hanau (30 October) and Hocheim (2 November) enabled his troops to get back to France, but the Allies were soon to enter that land.

Liberation of the Pope: End of the Empire

The liberation of the pope figured on the programme of the Allies. In vain did the emperor send the Marchesa di Brignoli to Consalvi, and Fallot de Beaumont, Archbishop of Bourges, to Pius VII, to open negotiations. In vain, on 18 January, 1814, when he learned that Murat had gone over to the Allies and occupied the Roman provinces on his own account, did he offer to restore the Papal States to Pius VII. Pius VII declared that such a restitution was an act of justice, and could not be made the subject of a treaty. Meantime, Blücher and Schwarzenberg were advancing through Burgundy. On 24 January, Lagorse, the commandant of gendarmes who had guarded Pius VII for four years, announced to him that he was about to take him back to Rome. The pope was conveyed by short stages through southern and central France. Napoleon defeated the Allies at Saint Dizier and at Brienne (27 29 January, 1814), the princes offered peace on condition that Napoleon should restore the boundaries of France to what they were in 1792. He refused. As the Allies demanded the liberation of the pope, Napoleon sent orders to Lagorse, who was taking him through the south of France, to let him make his way to Italy. On 10 March the prefect of Montenotte received orders to have the pope conducted as far as the Austrian outposts in the territory of Piacenza. The captivity of Pius VII was at an end.

The war was resumed immediately after the Congress of Chatillon. In five days Napoleon gave battle to Blücher four times at Champaubert, Montmirail, Chateau Thierry, and Vauchamp, and hurled him back on Chalons; against Schwarzenberg he fought the battles of Guiges, Mormant, Nangis, and Méry, thus opening the way to Troyes. But Lyons was taken by the Austrians, Bordeaux by the English. Exhausted as he was Napoleon beat Blücher again at Craonne (7 March), retook Reims and Epernay, and contemplated cutting off the retreat of Blücher and Schwarzenberg on the Rhine. He caused a general levy to be decreed; but the Allies had their agents in Paris. Marmont and Mortier capitulated. On 31 March the Allies entered Paris. On 3 April the Senate declared Napoleon dethroned. Returning to Fontainebleau, the emperor, determined to try one last effort, was stopped by the defection of Marmont's corps at Essonnes. On 20 April he left Fontainebleau; on 4 May he was in Elba.

At the end of ten months, learning of the unpopularity of the regime founded in France by Louis XVIII, Napoleon secretly left Elba, landed at Cannes (1 March, 1815), and went in triumph from Grenoble to Paris (20 March, 1815). Louis VIII fled to Ghent. Then began the Hundred Days. Napoleon desired to give France liberty and religious peace forthwith. On the one hand, by the Acte Additionnel, he guaranteed the country a constitutional Government; on the other hand (4 April, 1815), he caused the Duke of Vicenza to write to Cardinal Pacca, and he himself wrote to Pius VII, letters in a pacific spirit, while Isoard, auditor of the Rota, was commissioned to treat with the pope in his name. But the Coalition was re formed. Napoleon had 118,000 recruits against more than 800,000 soldiers; he beat Blücher at Ligny (16 June), whilst Ney beat Wellington at Quatre Bras; next day, at Waterloo, Napoleon was victorious over Bülow and Wellington until seven o'clock in the evening, but the arrival of 30,000 Prussians, under Blücher, resulted in the emperor's defeat. He abdicated in favour of his son, set out for Rochefort, and claimed the hospitality of England. England declared him the prisoner of the Coalition and, in spite of his protests, had him taken to the Island of St. Helena. There he remained until his death, strictly watched by Hudson Lowe, and dictated to General Montholon, Gourgaud, and Bertrand those "Mémoires" which entitle him to a place among the great writers. Las Casas, at the same time, wrote day by day, the "Mémorial de Sainte Hélène", a journal of the emperor's conversations. In the first of his captivity, Napoleon complained to Montholon of having no chaplain. "It would rest my soul to hear Mass", he said. Pius VII petitioned England to accede to Napoleon's wish, and the Abbé Vignali became his chaplain. On 20 April, 1821, Napoleon said to him: "I was born in the Catholic religion. I wish to fulfil the duties it imposes, and receive the succour it administers." To Montholon he affirmed his belief in God, read aloud the Old Testament, the Gospels, and the acts of the Apostles. He spoke of Pius VII as "an old man full of tolerance and light". "Fatal circumstances," he added "embroiled our cabinets. I regret it exceedingly." Lord Rosebery has attached much importance to the paradoxes with which the emperor used to tease Gourgaud, and amused himself in maintaining the superiority of Mohammedanism, Protestantism, or Materialism. One day, when he had been talking in this strain, Montholon said to him: "I know that your Majesty does not believe one word of what you have just been saying". "You are right", said the emperor. "At any rate it helps to pass an hour."

Napoleon was not an unbeliever; but he would not admit that anyone was above himself, not even the pope. "Alexander the great", he once said to Fontanes, "declared himself the son of Jupiter. And in my time I find a priest who is more powerful than I am." This transcendent pride dictated his religious policy and utterly vitiated it. By the Concordat, as Talleyrand said, he had "done not only an act of justice, but also a very clever act, for by this one deed he had rallied to himself the sympathies of the whole Catholic world." But the same Talleyrand declares, in his "Mémoires", that his struggle with Rome was produced by "the most insensate ambition", and that when he wished to deprive the pope of the institution of bishops, "he was all the more culpable because he had had before him the errors of the Constituent Assembly". This double judgment of the former Constitutional bishop, later the emperor's minister of foreign affairs, will be accepted by posterity. By a strange destiny, this emperor who travelled all over Europe, and whose attitude towards the Catholic religion was in a measure inherited from the old Roman emperors, never set foot in Rome; through him Rome was for many years deprived of the presence of the remotest successor of St. Sylvester and of Leo III; but the successor of Constantine and of Charlemagne did not see Rome, and Rome did not see him.

Chief Sources. Correspondence de Napoléon premier (1858 sqq.); Lecestre, Lettres inédites de Napoléon I (Paris, 1897); OxxEuvres de Napoléon Bonaparte (Paris, 1822); Mémoires dictés a Sainte Hélène, ed. Lacroix (Paris, 1904); Las Casas, Mémorial de Sainte Hélène (London, 1853); Memoirs of Chateaubriand and Talleyrand.

General Works. Thiers, The Consulate and the Empire under Napoleon (tr. London, 1893); Allison, History of Europe from the commencement of the French Revolution to the restoration of the Bourbons (Edinburgh, 1849 1858); Rose, The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era (Cambridge, 1907); Hazlitt, Life of Napoleon Bonaparte (London, 1894); Watson, Napoleon, a Sketch of his Life (New York, 1902); Sloane, Life of Napoleon Bonaparte (New York, 1896); Taine, Modern Régime, tr. Durand (London, 1904); Levy, Napoléon intime (Paris, 1893; reprinted, Edinburgh, 1910); Masson, Napoléon dans sa jeunesse (Paris, 1907); Idem, Napoléon et sa famille (Paris, 1897 1907); Idem, Napoléon et son fils (Paris, 1904); Idem, Napoléon inconnu (Paris, 1895); Idem, Josephine empress and queen, tr. Hoey (London, 1899). In France Frédéric is now the foremost student of Napoleonic history. His numerous works are indispensable for a knowledge of the Empire.

Special Studies. His Religious Sentiments. Bourgine, Première communion et fin chrétienne de Napoléon (Tours, 1897); Fischer, Napoleon I, dessen Lebens und Charaktersbild mit besonderer Rücksicht auf seine Stelling zur christlichen Religion (Leipzig, 1904).

His Youth. Chuquet, La jeunesse de Napoléon (Paris, 1897 98); Browning, Boyhood and Youth of Napoleon, 1760 1793 (London, 1906).

The Coming of Napoleon. Vandal, Avènement de Bonaparte (Paris, 1902 1907).

Relations with England. Coquelle, Napoleon and England (1808 1813), tr. Knox (London, 1904); Levy, Napoléon et la paix (Paris, 1902); Wheeler and Broadley, Napoleon and the Invasion of England, the story of the Great Terror (London, 1908); Alger, Napoleon's British visitors and captives (Westminster, 1904); Grand Carteret, Napoléon en images, estampes anglaises (Paris, 1895); Ashton, English Caricature and Satire on Napoleon I (London, 1884).

Relations with Spain. DeGrandmaison, L'Espagne sous Napoléon (Paris, 1908).

The Divorce. Welschinger, Le divorce de Napoléon (Paris, 1889); Rineri, Napoleone e Pio VII (1804 1813); (Turin, 1906).

Relations with Russia. Vandal, Napoléon et Alexandre I (Paris, 1891 1894); De Ségur, Histoire de Napoléon et de la Grande Armée pendant l'année 1812, in the Nelson collection (Edinburgh, 1910).

The End. Wolseley, Decline and Fall of Napoleon (London, 1895); Rosebery, Napoleon, the Last Phase (London, 1900); Browning, Fall of Napoleon (London, 1907); Houssaye, 1814 (Paris, 1888); Idem, 1815 (Paris, 1893 99); Idem, Waterloo, tr. Mann (London, 1900); Seaton, Napoleon's captivity in relation to Sir Hudson Lowe (London, 1903).

Italian and Religious Policy. De Barral, Fragments relatifs à l'histoire ecclésiastique du 19ième siècle (Paris, 1814); DePradt, Les quatre concordats (Paris, 1818); Ricard, Correspondance diplomatique et papiers inédits du cardinal Maury (Paris, 1891).

Words of Erudition. Bouvier, Bonaparte en Italie: 1796 (Paris, 1899); Driault, Napoléon en Italie (Paris, 1906); D'Haussonville, L'église romaine et le premier empire (Paris, 1868); Welschinger, Le pape et l'empereur 1804 1815 (Paris, 1905); Rinieri, Napoleone e Pio VII, 1804 1813 (Turin, 1906); Madelin, La Rome de Napoléon: la domination française à Rome de 1809 à 1814 (Paris, 1906); Chotard, Le pape Pie VII à Savone (Paris, 1887); Destram, La déportation des pretres sous Napoléon I in Rev. Hist., XI (1879); De Lanzac de Laborie, Paris sous Napoleon: la religion (Paris, 1907); Lyonnet, Histoire de Mgr d'Aviau (Paris, 1847); Meric, Histoire de M. Emery (Paris, 1895); de Grandmaison, Napoléon et les Cardinaux noirs (1895); Caussette, Vie du Card. d'Astros (Paris, 1853); Guillaume, Vie épiscopale de Mgr d'Osmond (Paris, 1862); Marmottan, L'institution canonique et Napoléon I: l'archevêque d'Osmond à Florence in Revue Historique, LXXXVI (1904); see also bibliographies to Concordat of 1801; Articles, the Organic; Pius VI; Pius VII. For a fuller bibliography of the subject, consult Kirchheisen, Bibliographie de l'époque de Napoléon I (Paris, 1908); Davois, Bibliographie Napoléonienne française jusqu'en 1908; I (Paris, 1909); Rivista Napoleonica (1901 sqq.).

GEORGES GOYAU

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